Gauthier Fontanive

I investigate how political favoritism based on cultural lines contributes to non-state conflict between ethnic groups in Africa from 1997 to 2021. By linking temporal changes in the ethnic composition of national governments with geolocated instances of non-state ethnic violence, I find that dyadic-level cultural asymmetry - defined as the difference in cultural proximity between two ethnic groups and the government - significantly increases both the likelihood and intensity of conflict between these groups, especially when the conflict events involve material resources. I then attempt to quantify ethnic favoritism through three distinct measures: the allocation of Chinese foreign aid, disparities in night-time light emissions as a proxy for public infrastructure distribution, and individual-level perceptions of unfair treatment captured through survey data. These measures reveal how discriminatory government practices intensify perceptions of inequality, escalating inter-ethnic tensions and fueling conflict between ethnic groups within the same country.

We study how shared collective experiences that make diversity salient impact public attitudes toward immigration. Combining 11 waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2023) with data on European national football team performance in major international competitions and team diversity, we exploit quasi-random variation in match timing relative to survey interviews to identify shifts in immigration attitudes. We develop two measures of diversity: a surname-based ancestry index and machine-learning measures of skin tone and racial classification. We find that following defeats, respondents in countries with a more diverse national team perceive immigrants to have a worse impact on their country. Victories, in contrast, lead to higher desired levels of immigration. These effects are strongest following unexpected or close defeats. Our results suggest that collective experiences such as international sporting competitions generate strong emotional responses that may translate into important attitude shifts. While victories involving immigrant-origin players can create more favorable attitudes towards immigrants as a group, the same individuals can become the scapegoats when national pride is threatened.

This paper examines how violent contests for state power, defined as battles between politically organized armed groups, affect mining firms’ operations in Africa. Using ACLED conflict data and SNL Metals and Mining Intelligence mining data for the period 1997 to 2021, we show that the frequency of nearby state power battles is positively associated with both total production and operational costs at mine sites. Our identification strategy combines spatial variation in conflict exposure with a two-way fixed effects design and staggered difference-in-differences models. The effects are strongest for foreign-owned mines and for minerals with high value-to-weight ratios. The association is particularly pronounced when the government retains control of the territory after the conflict. We argue that firms respond strategically to territorial uncertainty by investing in security and maintaining relationships with incumbent authorities, which helps sustain production despite increased costs. This study contributes to the literature on conflict and firm behavior by showing that, in sectors characterized by high sunk costs and limited relocation options, such as mining, political violence does not affect economic activity in a trivial way.